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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-
2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented for review are the following: 
1. Did the district court err in submitting the third-party attorney fees claim to 
the jury under the facts of this case? This is a question of law, and is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 
471 (UtahApp. 1993). 
2. Did the district court err by giving confusing and contradictory instructions 
to the jury? This issue is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
which are determinative of the issues appealed by Appellant Tolman. However, Rule 51, 
Utah R. Civ. P., is applicable to the analysis of Tolman's issues. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
In this case Plaintiff-Appellant R.C. Tolman and Plaintiff/Cross-Appellee Lava Bluff 
Water Company, Inc. ("Lava Bluff") sued Defendant, Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
Winchester Hills Water Company, Inc. ("WHWC") for damages for WHWC's use of Lava 
Bluffs one-third ownership interest in the WHWC water system, and for damages for loss 
of business due to WHWC's refusal to provide water service to Lava Bluffs residential 
building lots in the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. The original complaint included 
other causes of action, including claims against certain individuals (Record on Appeal, 
hereinafter "R.," 1-15). However, those other claims were dismissed prior to trial yja either 
stipulation or partial summary judgments and are not at issue on appeal. 
Pursuant to stipulation, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellee Eaglebrook Corporation 
("Eaglebrook") was joined as a party to the action. R. 121-22. WHWC counterclaimed for 
return of Lava Bluffs one-third interest in its water system and for an adjudication that 
Tolman was obligated to transfer 25 acre feet of water to WHWC under the terms of 
certain agreements between Tolman and the other developer of the Winchester Hills 
Subdivision area. WHWC also counterclaimed against Tolman for unauthorized use of 
WHWC water and unpaid WHWC water-stock assessments, and for attorney fees from 
Tolman resulting from its defense of Lava Bluffs claims. R. 378-395. 
The parties' various causes were tried to a jury commencing on August 30, and 
ending on September 3, 1993. (Trial Transcript, Vols. I-V, hereinafter "T.") At the close 
of Lava Bluffs case the trial court granted WHWC's motion for a directed verdict on both 
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of Lava Bluffs claims. T. 631-39. At the close of WHWC's case the trial court granted, 
in part, the directed verdict motions of Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff ordering that 
Tolman was not obligated to transfer 25 acre feet of water to WHWC. T. 780-82, 793-95. 
Lava Bluff stipulated that it would reconvey the one-third interest in WHWC's water system 
to Eaglebrook (T. 790), and the court imposed a constructive trust on Eaglebrook's title to 
those assets for the benefit of WHWC while denying WHWC's request that the assets be 
conveyed to it. T. 785-96. Instructions and a special verdict were submitted to the jury 
asking it to find the amount of damages, if any, Tolman owed WHWC for his use of its 
water and for his failure to pay water-stock assessments, and whether Tolman should be 
responsible in damages to WHWC under the third-party attorney fee rule for breaching 
fiduciary duties he owed WHWC which resulted in legal expenses to WHWC in defending 
Lava Bluffs claims based upon its one-third ownership of the WHWC system and in 
securing the return of 125 acre feet of water right which Tolman had transferred to his wife 
and him from WHWC. R. 1310-13,1314-43. 
The jury rendered its special verdict in favor of WHWC finding that Tolman had 
breached fiduciary duties to WHWC by entering certain agreements which transferred 
one-third of WHWC's water system to Eaglebrook and by transferring the 125 acre feet of 
water right out of WHWC, and that Tolman was responsible to pay reasonable attorney 
fees to WHWC as damages incurred in defending Lava Bluffs action against it based on 
a claim of ownership in that one-third of WHWC's water system and in pursuing an action 
against Tolman and his wife to secure return of the 125 acre feet of water. The jury also 
awarded WHWC damage amounts on its claims against Tolman for water use and water-
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stock assessments. See: Addendum 1, Special Verdict of the Jury, dated 3 September 
1993, and Addendum 2, Judgment, entered 5 October 1993; R-1310-13,1354-62. 
Tolman appeals the jury's finding of his responsibility for attorney-fee damages and 
the trial court's subsequent judgment against him of $23,428 in favor of WHWC for the 
fees claimed by its counsel. See: Addendum 3, Judgment and Award of Attorney's Fees, 
entered 22 April 1994, R. 2009-30. 
WHWC cross-appeals from the trial court's rulings that Tolman was not obligated 
to provide 25 acre feet of water to WHWC, and that Eaglebrook would not be ordered to 
convey to WHWC the one-third interest it holds in the water system but, instead, that a 
constructive trust for the benefit of WHWC would be imposed on Eaglebrook's ownership 
of those assets. 
2. Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review by Appellant Tolman. 
In 1979 a group of individuals organized a Utah corporation they named Shad 
Investment and Development Company ("Shad" or "SIDCO") to develop a subdivision in 
Washington County, Utah, called Winchester Hills. (Trial Exhibits, hereinafter "Ex.," P-1.) 
The following year, 1980, the same individuals organized Winchester Hills Water 
Company, Inc. ("WHWC") as a non-profit, mutual water company to provide water service 
to the Winchester Hills Subdivision area to be developed by SIDCO. Ex. P-4. In the mid-
1980s all but two of the original incorporator-developers separated from the companies 
leaving Russell Walter and Plaintiff R. C. Tolman as the only owners, director-officers and 
trustees of both corporations. T. 127-28. 
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By 1988 Tolman and Walter had decided to terminate their business relationship. 
To accomplish their separation they agreed that SIDCO would transfer one-half of its 
assets and liabilities to another Utah company, Eaglebrook Corporation, and that 100 
percent of the stock of Eaglebrook would be transferred to Tolman. Tolman, in turn, would 
surrender his SIDCO stock and Walter would own 100 percent of that company. T. 147-
197. As for their control of WHWC through SIDCO (T. 134-35, 582), they agreed the 
assets comprising the Winchester Hills Subdivision's water production, storage and 
delivery system-which had been constructed, and was owned, by SIDCO-would be 
divided and assigned one-third to WHWC, one-third to SIDCO and one-third to 
Eaglebrook. These agreements were memorialized in two writings: a Water Agreement, 
dated January 19, 1989, and a comprehensive settlement Agreement executed on 
February 25, 1989, the effective date of which was recited to be December 31, 1988. 
Exs. P-14, P-15 and P-18. 
At the time of the January 19 and February 25, 1989, agreements Tolman and 
Walter were the sole officers and trustees of WHWC, and they controlled all its voting 
stock through SIDCO. T. 134,138-39. Prior to that time no shares of water stock had 
been issued to homeowners who bought Winchester Hills Subdivision lots from SIDCO. 
T-136. Rather, SIDCO had entered into water user agreements with the homeowners 
allowing them either 1,000 or 1,600 gallons per day of WHWC culinary water. T. 525. It 
was the intent of Tolman and Walter in executing the January 19 and February 25,1989, 
agreements which accomplished the third-third-third distribution of the subdivision water 
system assets to safeguard the homeowners' use of WHWC water service and to protect 
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their own ability to develop and sell additional residential lots in the Winchester Hills 
Subdivision's various platted phases. T. 172, 242, 529-30. 
Almost immediately after signing the February 25, 1989, settlement Agreement 
Tolman and Walter began disputing its meaning and implementation. T. 183. Tolman had 
not signed the January 19, 1989, Water Agreement. Walter had taken it upon himself to 
draft and execute that agreement on behalf of SIDCO and WHWC. T. 175, 288, 532. It 
was not until two years later, in January 1991 in a lawsuit brought by SIDCO and Walter 
against WHWC, Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff, that it was established that the 
January 19, 1989, Water Agreement had been executed in furtherance of their February 
25, 1989, settlement Agreement and that it was binding upon Tolman and his company, 
Eaglebrook. T. 183, 249, 391; R. 1597 (Exhibit "L") and Ex. D-59. 
The post-agreement disputes between Tolman and Walter in 1989 led Tolman to 
transfer 125 acre feet of water out of WHWC's name and into the names of his wife and 
him, as joint tenants, in April of that year. Ex. D-65. He did this because Walter had 
delayed transferring one-third of the water system assets from SIDCO to WHWC as the 
February 25, 1989, settlement Agreement required. T. 360, 394, 542. 
By the first of May 1989, an independent board of directors for WHWC had been 
elected from among Winchester Hills Subdivision homeowners. T. 306. Prior to that time 
the developers, Tolman and Walter, had functioned as WHWC's officers and directors. 
T. 165, 309, 515. Finding themselves in the middle of the Tolman-Walter dispute, and 
unable to satisfy state regulatory requirements either for exemption from regulation as a 
mutual water company or for certification as a public utility as a result of WHWC's 
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fractional ownership of its water delivery system (T. 255), the new board of directors 
imposed a moratorium on water hook-ups to WHWC's system. T. 360. This prevented 
Toiman and Walters from selling any subdivision lots for which a building permit could be 
obtained. T. 362. So, Walters, for his part, accomplished the transfer from SIDCO to 
WHWC of the promised one-third of the water system assets (T. 255), and in July 1991 
he entered into a separate agreement with WHWC which permitted him to complete the 
development and sale of his Winchester Hills lots as contemplated under his separation 
agreement with Toiman. T. 267, 345; Ex. P-26. Toiman, for his part, organized Lava Bluff 
in July 1989 as a Utah corporation (T. 398, 547), and transferred Eaglebrook's one-third 
interest in the WHWC water delivery system to that new entity. T. 550, 734. Toiman then 
attempted to develop the Winchester Hills Subdivision lands which had been distributed 
to him under the separation agreement with Walter by delivering water service to his lots 
through Lava Bluff using the one-third interest in WHWC's system with his own Lava Bluff 
system. T. 398-409, 548. However, the WHWC board of directors actively resisted him. 
T. 355, 410. 
WHWC sued Toiman and his wife to recover the 125 acre feet of water which 
Toiman had conveyed out of WHWC in April 1989. WHWC was successful in that suit, 
and in January 1990 the district court for Washington County, Utah, declared Tolman's 
April 1989 water deed null and void. T. 360. The on-going dispute between Toiman and 
Walter, and the attempts by Toiman to subdivide his lands in, and adjacent to, the 
Winchester Hills Subdivision by providing water service through Lava Bluff, resulted in 
other lawsuits. The Public Service Commission also held a hearing on competing 
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applications by WHWC and Lava Bluff to be the certificated public utility with the sole right 
to provide water service to the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. Although the Public 
Service Commission held that WHWC should be awarded that certificated responsibility, 
the disputes between WHWC and Tolman continued. This lawsuit was eventually filed. 
Tolman's issues on appeal center on the jury's finding that he was responsible to 
pay the attorney fee expenses WHWC incurred in defending Lava Bluffs claim that 
WHWC owed it for damages for using the one-third of WHWC's water system it owned. 
The special verdict form submitted to the jury is Addendum 1. The special interrogatories 
in that verdict on the third-party attorney fees issues are No. 7 (related to the one-third 
division of the WHWC water system) and No. 8 (related to Tolman's deed of the 125 acre 
feet of water). The instructions given to the jury regarding the findings to be answered for 
those attorney-fee issues were Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16. R. 1329-32; Addendum 4. The 
jury sent a written question to the judge which read: "We are having a hard time 
understanding number three on Instruction No. 16. Will you please clarify what is meant 
by it." Court's Exhibit No. 3. The judge responded as follows: 
Instruction No. 16 is the instruction on damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty relating to the claim of Winchester Hills Water 
company against Mr. Tolman for signing the April 19th, 1989 
deed. And your question is regarding number three, that Mrs. 
Arleen Tolman was not connected with Mr. Tolman's signing 
the April 19, 1989 deed. 
This is a statement of the law in this matter, and I -my 
obligation is to give you the law. It's your obligation to find the 
facts in the matter and to apply the law to the facts as you find 
them and come up with a verdict. I can't clarify it any more 
than that. It's a factual question which you're going to have to 
determine. And that question is simply whether or not Mrs. 
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Tolman was somehow connected with the act of Mr. Tolman in 
signing the April 19,1989 deed, which contained the language 
attempting to transfer some water rights from the water 
company. 
T. 848. 
Although the jury found Mrs. Tolman was not connected to her husband's act of 
signing the water deed, that is, that she was a third party, and answered special 
interrogatory No. 8 'Yes," the trial court set that finding aside at the subsequent bench 
hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded WHWC. Hearing Transcript 
(Judge's Ruling Only), March 4,1994, pp. 7-8. 
The record shows that Lava Bluff was not a third person in the sense contemplated 
by the third-party attorney fee rule. Lava Bluff was owned and controlled by Tolman, and 
he considered Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff as "principle companies of myself." T. 538, 547, 
549'50 WHWC's first independent president, Don Reusch, referred to Lava Bluff as 
'Tolman." T. 349. Reusch testified it was his understanding that Tolman owned all of the 
Lava Bluff corporation and in his mind Tolman was operating as Lava Bluff "personally." 
T. 750. Reusch had been president of WHWC during the time it encountered the majority 
of its problems with Tolman. The manager of the compliance and water section of the 
Utah State Division of Public Utilities, Ralph Creer, referred to Lava Bluff and Tolman 
interchangeably in describing their activities in the Winchester Hills Subdivision area. T. 
442-43. A recent WHWC board member, Lee Chugg, testified that WHWC had been 
unable to get insurance because it lacked title to one-third of its water system which 
Tolman "owns." T. 773. 
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Also, the one-third interest in the water system held in Lava Bluffs name when this 
lawsuit commenced was conveyed to it by Tolman from his wholly-owned company, 
Eaglebrook. T. 734. Eaglebrook had acquired title to those assets from SIDCO when 
Tolman and Walter separated (T. 196-97, 502, 523; Exhibit P-15, page 3, sub-fl 9), and 
Walter referred to Eaglebrook as 'Tolman." T. 246-662. In support of a partial summary 
judgment motion in this action, WHWC argued that each of the Plaintiffs, including Lava 
Bluff, was bound by a ruling in an earlier lawsuit concerning the enforceability of the 
January 19,1989, Water Agreement against Eaglebrook because they were in privity with 
Eaglebrook. R. 448-49,451-59. The court below granted the motion, ruling that WHWC 
could enforce the provisions of the January 19 and February 25, 1989 agreements against 
the Plaintiffs, including Lava Bluff, by reason of collateral estoppel. R. 1551-53. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Tolman contends the trial court erred in submitting WHWC's claim for an 
award of attorney fees against him to the jury on the basis of the third-party attorney fees 
rule. Tolman asserts that the record facts demonstrate that he was not a third person in 
the context of the action brought against WHWC by Lava Bluff. Rather, he was sufficiently 
in control of Lava Bluff and connected to it—both factually and in the law's contemplation-
that an identity of interest and legal status existed between Lava Bluff and him. Tolman 
urges the Court to recognize that a privity analysis is appropriate in determining whether 
a litigant is a third person for purposes of applying the third-party attorney fees rule. 
Viewed from that perspective, Tolman contends the record shows Lava Bluff was not a 
third party to the contracts and transactions surrounding the division of water system 
assets in question out of which the litigation against WHWC eventually arose. The trial 
court recognized the unique legal nature of the relationships which resulted from the 
contracts by which Tolman's company, Eaglebrook, obtained title to the water system 
assets and the legal consequence of Eaglebrook's assignment of those assets to Lava 
Bluff by imposing a constructive trust upon those assets for the benefit of WHWC. Both 
factually and legally, Lava Bluff was Tolman in the context of this lawsuit. 
The trial court's jury instructions on the third-party attorney fee rule failed to 
enlighten the jury regarding their tasks and, in fact, confronted them with unnecessary 
problems. The instructions contradicted both the finding of the court and the argument of 
Defendant WHWC that Tolman was one with both Lava Bluff and Eaglebrook by 
suggesting that Lava Bluff might not be "connected with" Mr. Tolman. Further, by i equiring 
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specific findings which are logically incompatible with one another, but which all must exist 
together in order to apply the third-party attorney fee rule in this case, one of the 
instructions invites an illogical and incorrect application of that rule to the facts of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
BY SUBMITTING THE THIRD-PARTY 
ATTORNEY FEES CLAIM 
TO THE JURY. 
As an exception to the general rule that a party may not recover attorney fees in the 
absence of a statutory or contractual provision, Utah recognizes the "third-party tort rule." 
In South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279,1282 (Utah App. 1988), this exception was 
recognized to have application when 
[T]he natural consequence of one's negligence is another's 
involvement in a dispute with a third party, attorney fees 
reasonably incurred in resolving the dispute are recoverable 
from the negligent party as an element of damages. 
This Court cited Washington state case law in the South Sanpitch opinion as an 
example of the restatement, above, of the third-party attorney fees rule. Jd. at 1282. In 
this case WHWC quoted a Washington state appellate court's formulation of the third-
party rule in support of its argument that a claim against Tolman for attorney fees was 
justified by the evidence. R. 301-04. That case is Morgan v. Roller. 794 P.2d 1313,1315 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990), and its formulation of the rule was: 
[A] wrongful act or omission of A . . . toward B . . . ; such act or 
omission exposes or involves B in litigation with C . . . ; and C 
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was not connected with the original wrongful act or omission 
A toward B. 
The court below adopted this formulation of the third-party attorney fee rule in 
fashioning Instruction No. 15 which was given to the jury. See: Addendum No. 4, R. 
1331. Tolman's trial counsel took exception to this instruction, asserting that the third-
party attorney fee rule had no application under the facts of this case. T. 799-800. Tolman 
contends on appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law by instructing the jury as 
it did in Instruction No. 15 because the facts clearly demonstrate that Lava Bluff was not 
a third person in the legal sense contemplated by third-party attorney fee rule. This follows 
when considered in the context of the facts surrounding Tolman's acquisition of the one-
third interest in the Winchester Hills water system and his transfer of that one-third interest 
to Eaglebrook and, in turn, to Lava Bluff. 
Referring, again, to Washington case law, the Supreme Court of that state -
explaining the third-party exception to the general rule that attorney fees are not allowed 
in the absence of contract or statute-has held as follows: 
In those actions, where the acts or omissions of a party to an 
agreement or event have exposed one to litigation by third 
persons—that is, to suit by persons not connected with the 
initial transaction or event-the allowance of attorney's fees 
may be a proper element of consequential damages. . . . 
[citation omitted] We said this again in Wells v. Aetna Ins. 
Co.. 60 Wash. 2d. 880, 376 .2d 644, with the statement: 
These cases hold that when the natural and 
proximate consequences of a wrongful act by 
defendant involve plaintiff in litigation with 
others, there may, as a general rule, be a 
recovery of damages for the reasonable 
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expenses incurred in the litigation, including 
compensation for attorneys fees.' 
The fulcrum upon which the rule balances, then, is whether the 
action, for which attorney's fees are claimed as consequential 
damages, is brought or defended bv third persons-that is. 
persons not privy to the contract, agreement or events through 
which the litigation arises. 
Armstrong Construction Company v. Thomson. 
390 P.2d 976, 979-80 (Wash. 1964)(emphasis added). 
Lava Bluff was either in privity with, or so closely interconnected to, the legal and 
contractual obligations of Tolman regarding the creation of the one-third share of WHWC's 
water system assets under the January 19 and February 25,1989 agreements that Lava 
Bluff was not a "third person" for purposes of a third-party attorney fees rule analysis. As 
a successor-in-interest to the same property rights which were transferred from SIDCO to 
Eaglebrookfor the benefit and use of Tolman, Lava Bluff was in privity of estate with the 
original contracting parties (namely, WHWC, SIDCO, Walter and Tolman) with regard to 
the events through which this litigation eventually arose. 
In Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978), our Supreme Court 
stated: 
The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a 
person so identified in interest with another that he represents 
the same legal right. This includes a mutual or successive 
relationship to rights in property, [citing Taylor v. Barker. 70 
Utah 534, 262 P. 266 (1927)]. 
In this case it is clear that Tolman, through the entities Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff 
which he owned and controlled, created a mutual and successive relationship to rights in 
the same property, namely, the one-third interest in the Winchester Hills Subdivision water 
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system transferred from SIDCO pursuant to his separation agreements with Russell 
Walter. The trial court recognized this unique contractual and legal relationship when it 
ruled that the one-third interest was held in constructive trust for WHWC by virtue of the 
January 19 and February 25, 1989 contracts. Although Lava Bluff wasn't "part of the 
contract[s]," the court viewed Lava Bluff as holding the one-third interest under the terms 
of the contracts.1 T. 790-91. It would follow that Lava Bluff was so identified in interest 
with Tolman that its title to the one-third of the water system represented Tolman's legal 
right in the contemplation of the law. Therefore, Lava Bluff was not a third party. 
When analyzed from a factual viewpoint, the same conclusion is justified. Walter 
testified that "Eaglebrook" was Mr. Tolman. The first independent president of WHWC 
elected in May 1989, Don Reusch, who was involved in the majority of the problems the 
water had encountered with Tolman, referred to Lava Bluff as 'Tolman." He testified it was 
his impression that Tolman owned all of the corporations (Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff) and 
in his mind "he [Tolman] was operating [Lava Bluff] personally." Other witnesses to the 
Tolman-WHWC-Walter disputes had the same understanding of Lava Bluffs identification 
with Tolman, for example: Ralph Creer, the manager of the compliance and water section 
of the Utah Division of Public Utilities, described Lava Bluff and Tolman interchangeably, 
and Lee Chugg, a WHWC board member, explained that the water board had encountered 
insurance problems because it lacked the one-third interest in the water system that 
Tolman "owns." This testimony establishes beyond peradventure that those who dealt with 
1
 Generally, a party in a fiduciary or confidential relationship cannot assign 
contract rights or obligations without the express consent of the other party. 6 Am Jur 
2d, "Assignments," §11, p. 196. The trial court's ruling acknowledged this principle. 
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Tolman understood Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were entities which he owned and 
controlled, and that through them Tolman conducted his business affairs related to the 
one-third interest in the WHWC water system assets which he had obtained from SIDCO 
pursuant to the February 25,1989, separation Agreement with Walter. Accordingly, those 
corporations were so clearly identified with Tolman that this Court should recognize that 
Lava Bluff was not a true "third person" but, rather, was Tolman for purposes of analyzing 
the third-party attorney fee rule. As Tolman testified, "Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff are 
principal companies of myself." Therefore, under the law and facts of this case it was 
error for the trial court to submit the third-party attorney fees instruction to the jury as the 
basis for an award of damages against Tolman. Significantly, Tolman's argument on this 
point is supported by a motion WHWC made in this case. On April 7,1992, WHWC filed 
a motion for partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava 
Bluff seeking a declaration that the terms of the January 19 and February 25, 1989 
agreements could be imposed on each of them as a consequence of a ruling in a prior 
lawsuit in the same state district court, referred to as Litigation #2.2 R. 448-49,451-59. 
In Litigation #2 the court had ruled that the Water Agreement of January 19,1989, 
had been executed by Russell Walter for SIDCO and WHWC in furtherance of the 
comprehensive settlement Agreement signed by SIDCO, Walter, Tolman and Eaglebrook 
2
 Shad Investment and Development Corporation, a Utah corporation and Walter 
and Associates, a Utah corporation, and Russell J. Walter, an individual, Plaintiffs v. R. 
C. Tolman, an individual, Arleen Tolman his wife, R. C. Tolman Construction Company, 
Inc., a corporation, Eagle Brook [sic] Corporation, a corporation, Lava Bluff Water 
Company, a corporation, Winchester Hills Water Company, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants, in the Fifth District Court for Washington County, Utah, civil action No. 89-
2863 
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on February 25 1989, and that the Water Agreement was binding upon, and inured to the 
benefit of, SIDCO and Eaglebrook. R. 1597 (Exhibit "L," 3-ring binder, and also cited as 
Exhibit 11 in Exhibit A to WHWC's Request for Judicial Notice of Court Files Pursuant to 
Rule 201 U.R.E. filed in support of its partial summary judgment motion. R. 460-62.) In 
WHWC's memorandum supporting its motion for partial summary judgment, it argued that 
Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff had "been directly related to, or in privity with, the 
litigants in [Litigation # 2 ] . . . ." R. 452. Lava Bluff was named as a party-defendant in 
Litigation #2, but the order in that case, as it pertained to the enforceability of the January 
19, 1989 agreement, did not mention Lava Bluff, but only referred to Eaglebrook. 
Therefore, WHWC's partial summary judgment motion sought to tie the contractual knot 
against Tolman and his companies once and for all by imposing that prior judicial 
declaration on Lava Bluff. The court below agreed with WHWC's analysis and argument, 
and in granting the summary judgment sought by WHWC, ruled in part: 
IT IS ALSO ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 
that by reason of collateral estoppel Defendant Winchester 
Hills Water Company can enforce the provisions of the 
January 19, 1989 water agreement and February 25, 1989 
comprehensive settlement agreement against the Plaintiffs 
[Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff] 
R. 1552 
Accordingly, WHWC has previously made the same case for privity between Lava 
Bluff and Tolman-or "connectedness" to use the Washington state court's term employed 
in the trial court's jury instructions-as Tolman now makes in support of his argument that 
the third-party attorney fees rule should not have been applied against him. 
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POINT 2 
BY GIVING CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTORY 
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE THIRD-PARTY 
ATTORNEY FEE RULE, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
1. Utah Courts' Standard for Appellate Review of a Trial Court's Jury Instructions: 
Likelihood of Jury Confusion and Possibility of Different Verdict Absent Confusion. 
In civil cases based on the common law, such as the present case, Utah's appellate 
courts have reversed and remanded judgments on jury verdicts on the basis that unclear 
or confusing jury instructions had prejudiced a party. In such circumstances, prejudice has 
been found where there is a showing that the jury was probably confused by the 
instructions it received and might have returned a different verdict had it not been 
confused. Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital. 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992), discusses this 
legal standard. 
In Nielsen, plaintiffs bridge work was broken while she was in knee surgery. In her 
action against the hospital and the physician, plaintiff advanced the theories of common 
law negligence and £§£ ipsa loquitur. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of 
action, and on appeal the Supreme Court remanded for a new trial because the jury 
instructions were not adequately clear. The instruction on the £gs_ ipsa loquitur theory 
allowed for rebuttable inference of negligence if the elements of iss. ipsa loquitur were 
found. The instructions on negligence were stock instructions that suggested a finding of 
negligence depends on whether the standard of care has been met, so that negligence 
cannot be deduced from the fact of adverse outcome of surgery or complications attendant 
to surgery. 
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In Nielsen, the trial court had not specified that some of the instructions applied to 
the first theory and others to the second theory. Defendant argued that the language of 
the instructions gave the jury ample information on which to figure out the distinction 
between the two theories, but the Supreme Court rejected this argument on the basis that 
the instructions as a whole reinforced the erroneous notion that the two theories could be 
susceptible to the same analysis. 
We are not convinced . . . that lay jurors would be able to 
distinguish between these rather involved negligence theories 
and instructions simply by noting this one phrase [adverse 
results "in and of themselves" do not prove negligence]. 
While lawyers and judges with a background in negligence law 
may be able to discern which instructions apply to which 
theories, we are not satisfied that a lay jury could do so. We 
can only conclude that a potential for confusion was created. 
The confusion created by these instructions may well 
have denied Nielsen a fair trial. "What the party is entitled to 
is a fair presentation of the case to the jury under instructions 
that clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues and the 
law applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its 
duties. Hanks v. Christensen. 11 Utah 2d 8,12, 354 P.2d 564, 
566 (1960); see Wellman v. Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350, 352, 366 
P.2d 701, 702 (1961). Admittedly, the two separate theories 
of negligence complicated this case. Thus, special effort to 
simply and clarify the instructions was essential. This effort 
was lacking, and the instructions were consequently confusing 
and may well have prejudiced Nielsen's res ipsa loquitur case. 
. . . We view the potential for confusion here to have been 
substantial, and therefore conclude that the error was 
prejudicial in that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury's verdict may have been different absent the error. 
Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints Hospital. 10 Utah 2d 
94, 100, 348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960). 
830 P.2d at 274-275. 
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Under Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellate court usually does not 
review the trial court's jury instructions in the absence of a distinctly stated objection made 
before they are given. However, Rule 51 also provides that even if there is no objection 
to a jury instruction at the trial level, "the appellate court, in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction." Nielsen cites 
Rule 51 and demonstrates that it is appropriate for an appellate court to exercise such 
discretion where, as here, the potential for jury confusion about the trial court's instructions 
is substantial and there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict may have been 
different absent the confusion. The Nielsen court reversed and remanded because it 
concluded that the error of allowing such confusion is prejudicial. 
Last year this Court followed the same reasoning in Bradv v. Gibb. 886 P. 2d 104 
(Utah App. 1994), to reach the same conclusion about similarly unclear jury instructions. 
The Brady court also reversed and remanded because "[t]he trial court erred by giving 
contradictory and potentially confusing jury instructions." 886 P.2d at 107. 
2. |p the Instant Case, the Potential for Confusion Arising from the Jury Instructions 
on the Third-Party Attorney Fee Award Rule was Extremely High. 
A. The trial court's jury instructions failed to enlighten the jury. 
In Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1961), our Supreme Court 
explained that the "real inquiry" on error relative to jury instructions is "were the issues of 
fact necessary to be determined, and the principles of law applicable thereto, correctly 
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable manner?"3 By analogy, the question 
3
 The Court reemphasized this concept some four years later: 'The object of jury 
instructions is to enlighten the jury on their problems. Instructions should fit the facts 
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in the present case must be: "Was the legal concept of privity among business entities 
holding the same successive property interests under common contracts explained in the 
jury instructions with sufficient clarity to allow the jury to apply the concept correctly to the 
relevant facts? Did the jury fully comprehend the relationship between Lava Bluff and 
Tolman, and did the trial court's instructions adequately equip the jury to determine 
accurately whether that relationship resulted in Lava Bluff status as a third party, so the 
third-party attorney fee rule might be considered applicable in this situation?" As detailed 
below, the trial court's jury instructions did not accomplish these objectives. 
The Nielsen court noted that "jury instructions are to be read as a whole," 830 P.2d 
at 274, citing Startin v. Madsen. 120 Utah 631, 635, 237 P.2d 834, 838 (1951), and 
considered the relationship among relevant instructions as well as the content of each. 
In the present case, the trial court's jury instructions relevant to the third-party attorney fee 
rule were Nos. 13,14,15 and 16. Addendum 4. These instructions defined and applied 
the terms fiduciary, fiduciary relationship, and fiduciary relationship of corporate officers 
and directors (Instructions No. 13 and No. 14). They did not provide the jury with any 
guidance as to the legal concepts of "connectedness" or "privity" which would allow them 
to determine whether Lava Bluff was sufficiently distinguishable from Tolman for purposes 
of the third-party attorney fee rule to permit them to correctly answer "Yes" to the special 
interrogatory put to them on that issue. It was necessary for the jury to understand the 
shown, making them as clear in meaning and concise as possible in lay people's 
language . . . ." Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 
25 (Utah 1965). 
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privity relationship, as distinct from the fiduciary relationship,4 and the trial court's 
instructions to the jury made no effort to enlighten the jury on this critical distinction. 
B. The trial court's jury instructions caused confusion. 
Not only did Instructions Nos. 13,14,15 and 16 fail to enlighten the jury, they 
contributed to its confusion. The jury instructions and special interrogatories did not focus 
on the relevant legal concept of privity, but rather on an undefined "connection" among 
corporate and natural persons. The jury specifically expressed its confusion as to the 
meaning of the concept of "connectedness" by inquiring of the trial court as to the meaning 
of paragraph 3 in Instruction No. 16 dealing with Mrs. Tolman. Additionally explanatory 
instructions should have been given to guide the jury in determining whether the third-party 
attorney fee rule could be applied to award WHWC its fees incurred in the prior litigation 
against Tolman's wife. The special interrogatory required the jury to find that Mrs. Tolman 
was "not connected with" Tolman's signing of a deed in April of 1989 in order to award 
WHWC its fees. The jury did make such a finding, but at the subsequent hearing on 
attorney fees the trial court overturned their verdict on the issue, ruling that Tolman and 
his wife were too "interrelated" for such an award to be proper. 
4
 E.g., a fiduciary remains an entity separate from those to whom the fiduciary 
duty is owed; indeed, it is not uncommon for a fiduciary to be subject to legal action 
brought by those to whom the fiduciary duty is owed for any breach of that duty. Their 
business interests and objectives are not necessarily one and the same. In contrast, 
entities whose successive interests in property are one and the same (not parallel, not 
similar, but literally the same) are intrinsically incapable of such independent 
conduct as would render them different parties in an action relative to such property. 
As the Nielsen Court pointed out relative to the difference between res ipsa loquitur 
and common law negligence, this is wery likely a distinction a lay jury could not be 
expected to make without adequate explanation. 
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The record below indicates that the jury misinterpreted the concept of 
"connectedness" as the term is used in Instruction No. 15 as well. The record shows 
repeated references to Lava Bluff as one and the same with Tolman. WHWC itself had 
argued in support of a partial summary judgment motion in this action that Plaintiffs 
Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were in privity with one another in the law's 
contemplation. Specifically, WHWC argued that Lava Bluff, together with Eaglebrook and 
Tolman, should be bound by the ruling in an earlier lawsuit which enforced the January 
19, 1989 Water Agreement against Eaglebrook. The trial court endorsed the argument 
that Tolman, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff were one and the same by granting WHWC's 
motion on the basis that all three were collaterally estopped from relitigating the prior 
ruling. 
Notwithstanding its own concurrence in the position that Lava Bluff was in privity 
with Mr. Tolman, the trial court instructed the jury,". . . before you can find Mr. Tolman 
liable to pay Winchester Hills Water Company's reasonable attorney fees, you must find 
. . . [t]hat Lava Bluffs [sic] Water Company was not connected with Mr. Tolman's original 
breach of fiduciary duty." As a matter of reason and logic, the jury could not have 
considered Tolman and Lava Bluff to be one in interest and at the same time "not 
connected with" one another. 
Their determination that Mr. Tolman was "not connected with" Lava Bluff Water 
Company-an entity he created, owned and controlled, which was referred to repeatedly 
on the record as one and the same with Tolman-suggests that they were equally as 
confused by the term "connected with" appearing in Instruction No. 15 as in Instruction No. 
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16. Viewed as a whole, the trial court's jury instructions on the third-party attorney fee rule 
were highly likely to confuse the jury, both by the combination of information they gave and 
relied on and by the information and distinctions they failed to articulate. 
C. The trial court's Jury Instruction No. 15 was internally inconsistent. 
The third paragraph of Instruction No. 15 requires the jury to find that Lava 
Bluff was "not connected with" Tolman's original breach of fiduciary duty in order for them 
to find Tolman liable to pay WHWC's attorney fees incurred in defending Lava Bluffs 
lawsuit. Any such breach, incident to Tolman's transfer of one-third of SIDCO's water 
system assets to Eaglebrook, would have been under the terms of the February 25, 1989 
separation Agreement Tolman entered into with Walter. If Lava Bluff was "not connected 
with" Tolman at that time, it could only have been because Lava Bluff did not exist then: 
it was created in July 1989. However, the first two paragraphs of Instruction No. 15 
suggest that from the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Tolman, Lava Bluffs action 
against Winchester Hills was foreseeable. It is intrinsically impossible to foresee an action 
being brought by an entity that does not exist. 
The jury could not have been anything but confused by Instruction No. 15. If 
Tolman breached before Lava Bluff was created, then it may be possible to conclude that-
at that time-Lava Bluff was "not connected with" Tolman. But it is not also possible to 
conclude that-at that time-Lava Bluffs claim was foreseeable and resulted from the 
breach. 
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3. The Inadequacy of the Jury Instruction Concerning the Third-Party Attorney Fee 
Rule was Prejudicial to Tolman. 
Where, as here, instructions potentially create confusion of the jury, and the jury's 
verdict could have been different had the instructions been thorough and clear, legal 
precedent in Utah is to reverse the trial court's judgment on the jury's verdict and remand 
for renewed proceedings on the issue. This precedent should be followed in the instant 
case. 
The jury requested further explanation of the phrase "connected with" as it was 
used in Instruction No. 16 concerning the applicability of the third-party attorney fee rule 
to Mrs. Tolman. The jury had also been presented with the same phrase in Instruction No. 
15 concerning the applicability of the third-party attorney fee rule to Mr. Tolman without 
any more clarification of its meaning in that context than in Instruction No. 16. If the trial 
court's instructions to the jury on the third-party attorney fee rule had clarified rather than 
obscured this concept, the jury could have seen that Lava Bluff was never a party separate 
from Tolman. Therefore, Lava Bluff could not have been a "third party" within the meaning 
of the third-party attorney fee rule at any time. Had the jury understood that Lava Bluff was 
not, and could not have been, a third party for this purpose, it would have returned a 
different verdict on the issue of attorney fees in this case. 
In the instant case, as in Nielsen, supra, the potential for confusion was substantial, 
and the trial court's error in providing contradictory and internally inconsistent instruction 
to the jury on the third-party attorney fee rule was prejudicial. There is at least a 
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reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been different absent that error. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, the jury's special verdict finding Tolman responsible to pay 
WHWC's attorney fees incurred in defending Lava Bluffs claims, and the court's judgment 
against him for $23,428, should be set aside and vacated, and the attorney fees claim 
against Tolman should be dismissed. Alternatively, the special verdict and judgment 
should be set aside and vacated, and the matter should be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to reconsider the attorney fee issue under circumstances in which the finder 
of fact is correctly advised as to the legal concepts and standards to be applied in 
resolving that issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ Jt day of May 1995. jr f I 
CLYDE JSNOW & SWENSON, P.C. 
— ^ 
Gary br Paxton, 
i 
Susannah E. Kesler 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Tolman 
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ADDENDUM 1 
,3 SEP 3 ?7\ 4 11 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF 
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, 
INC., and JOHN DOES I through 
V, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT OP THE JURY 
Civil No. 900503383 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
We, the jury empaneled in the above-referenced case, find the 
issues of fact and answer the special interrogatories to us as 
follows: 
1. (a) Prior to May 1, 1989, did Winchester Hills Water 
Company authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the 
Winchester Hills Water £/SLam to water Mr. Tolman's 
pasture without paying ior it? 
Yes . _ No 
(b) i&t ft 
X 
(If you answered t^oe- to the question immediately above, 
3- 9ft 
do not answer this question. -=trfb) ) 
2. What is the amount of damage R. C. Tolman should pay for 
the use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture prior to May 1,1989? 
, QO 
3. What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture after May 1, 1989? 
' ,250-
4. (a) Prior to May 1, 1989, did Winchester Hills Water Company 
authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the unmetered 1 1/2 inch 
line to the shop without paying for it? 
Yes No 
(b)(If you answered Yes to the question immediately above,do 
not answer this question. 4 (b)). 
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop before 
May 1, 1989? <4f rn 
2 
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop 
after May 1, 1989? 
'55 ^ 
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water lost because of the leak at the Lava Bluff 
System? w 
Z50 OO 
Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee 
to Winchester Hills Water Company because of a Breach of 
Fiduciary^because of the 1/3 division of the water system? 
Yes X No 
3 
Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee 
to Winchester Hills Water Company for Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty by signing the Deed for 125 acre feet of water on April 
19, 1989? 
Yes x No 
DATED t h i s ^)Z- day of g t e p W J o e j T , 19 ^ 
JURY FOREPERSON 
CONCURRING JURORS: 
MfWialiTcL.OTfc X±2-
1& ^£<u£4u fC&>V^ 
jVi/^nm/^ f^uthwtffr^-J 
v <^%^L—-~ 
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ADDENDUM 2 
JEFFREY C. WILCOX (4441) 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
One South Main Street 
First Security Bank Building 
Post Office Box 367 
St- George, Utah 84771 
Telephone: (801) 628-1682 
Attorneys for Defendant Winchester Hills 
Water Company, Inc. 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF 
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, 
INC., and JOHN DOES I through 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900503383 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial on Monday, 
August 30, 1993. Trial was had on Plaintiff's claims against 
Defendants and the Defendant's counterclaims as to Plaintiffs. On 
Wednesday, September 1, 1993, at the close of Plaintiffs' case, 
Defendant moved for a directed verdict. After argument by counsel, 
the Court granted Defendant's Motion. On Thursday, September 2, 
1993, at the close of Defendant's counterclaim case, Plaintiff 
moved for a directed verdict. After argument from counsel, the 
Court granted a partial directed verdict in favor of Plaintiff, and 
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allowed the remaining issues to be decided by the jury. The jury 
rendered a special verdict on September 3, 1993. 
Based upon the evidence presented, motions and argument of 
counsel, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law as to the directed verdicts issued by the Court, 
and further enters Judgment on the jury's verdict. 
DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
AS TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
GENERAL STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in this matter on 
December 7, 1990. Said suit contained eight separate causes of 
action. Because of stipulations between the parties and/or partial 
summary judgments entered by the Court previous to trial, only two 
of Plaintiffs' causes of action came to trial. In the first cause 
of action, Plaintiff Lava Bluffs Water Company ("Lava Bluffs") 
sought compensation from Defendant Winchester Hills Water Company 
("WHWC") for the loss of the use of one-third of the Winchester 
Hills water system. In the third cause of action, Lava Bluffs 
sought damages from WHWC because WHWC allegedly prohibited Lava 
Bluffs from conducting business in the Winchester Hills area. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
1. Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, holds bare legal title to an 
undivided one-third of the Winchester Hills water system located in 
Winchester Hills Subdivision Phases I and II. 
2. WHWC owns an undivided two-thirds interest in said water 
system. 
3. Plaintiffs presented no evidence as to the value of the 
2 
* 0* 
one-third of the water system which Lava Bluffs holds bare legal 
title ar. 
4. Plaintiffs presented no evidence as to the amount of money 
Lava Bluffs claimed WHWC owed to Lava Bluffs for WHWC's use of the 
one-third of the water system. 
5. Plaintiffs presented no evidence as to the monetary 
damages suffered by Lava Bluffs as a result of WHWC's activities 
prohibiting Lava Bluffs from conducting business in the Winchester 
Hills area. 
6. The January 19, 1989 Agreement is binding on Eaglebrook 
Corporation and on WHWC. The January 19, 1989 Agreement stated 
that Plaintiffs would hold the one-third interest in the water 
company until Plaintiffs developed additional property in the 
Winchester Hills area. At the time of such development, the one-
third interest held by Plaintiffs would be transferred back to WHWC 
pursuant to the terms of the January 19, 1989 Agreement. 
7. Nowhere in the January 19, 1989 Agreement was there 
language entitling Plaintiffs to receive compensation from WHWC for 
use of the system. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, the Court issues the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, must put on a prima facie case as 
to every element of its claims. 
2. Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, claimed money damages for the loss 
of its use of the one-third interest in the Winchester Hills water 
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system. 
3. Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, failed to present any evidence 
regarding the value of its • one-third interest in the water system 
nor did it present any evidence as to the amount of damages it was 
claiming. 
4. Plaintiff Lava Bluffs, has failed to make a prima facie 
case for the jury's consideration. 
5. Furthermore, the January 19, 1989 Agreement does not 
entitle Plaintiffs to seek monetary compensation from WHWC for the 
use of Plaintiffs' one-third bare legal title interest in the water 
system. 
6. A directed verdict should be entered in favor of Defendant 
holding that Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
PARTIAL DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF AS AGAINST DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS 
GENERAL STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS 
WHWC counterclaimed against Plaintiffs claiming that 
Plaintiffs obtained legal title to one-third of the water system by 
breaching fiduciary duties owed by R.C. Tolman to WHWC. WHWC 
sought return of the one-third interest from Plaintiffs. WHWC also 
sought attorney's fees from Mr. Tolman based upon his alleged 
breach of fiduciary duties. 
WHWC further sought delivery of 25 acre feet of water from 
R.C. Tolman pursuant to the terms of the February 25, 1989 
Agreement. WHWC also sought compensation for various uses of water 
by R.C. Tolman. 
At the end of Defendant's Counterclaim case, the parties 
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stipulated that R.C. Tolman is obligated to pay a $100.00 
assessment and a $300.00 assessment to WHWC. 
Furthermore, during the course of Defendant's counterclaim 
case, Plaintiffs raised statute of limitations issues. • Based upon 
said issues, WHWC stipulated to not seek compensation damages for 
many of its originally claimed damages. 
As to those issues that the Court grant a directed verdict, 
the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Defendant's Counterclaim issues: 
1. Bare legal title to an undivided one-third interest in the 
Winchester Hills water system was transferred from SIDCO to 
Eaglebrook Corporation ("Eaglebrook") according to the terms of the 
February 25, 1989 Agreement. 
2. Eaglebrook held the undivided one-third interest in the 
Water Company pursuant to the terms of the January 19, 1989 
Agreement, which Agreement is binding and enforceable between 
Eaglebrook Corporation and WHWC. 
3. Pursuant to the plain language of said Agreements, 
Eaglebrook was to hold bare legal title to one-third of the water 
system until such time as it developed additional property in the 
Winchester Hills area. At the time of said development, Eaglebrook 
would return the one-third interest pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreements. 
4. Eaglebrook later transferred that one-third undivided 
interest" in the water system to Lava Bluffs. 
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5. WHWC agreed to be bound by the January 19, 1989 Agreement. 
Pursuant to the January 19, 1989 Agreement, WHWC agreed that it 
owned sufficient water to service Phases I and II in the Winchester 
Hills area. 
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court issues the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendant's Counterclaim issues: 
1. Lava Bluff holds bare legal title to an undivided one-
third interest in the Winchester Hills water system pursuant to the 
terms of the February 25, 1989, and January 19, 1989 Agreements. 
2. Lava Bluffs must return the one-third interest in said 
water system to Eaglebrook. The Court impresses a constructive 
trust upon the one-third interest held by Eaglebrook Corporation. 
Eaglebrook will hold that one-third interest in constructive trust 
for WHWC according to the terms of the January 19, 1989 Agreement. 
3. WHWC holds equitable title to the undivided one-third 
interest in the water system as limited by the January 19, 1989 
Agreement. 
4. As of December 31, 1988, there was no water shortfall owed 
to WHWC by any of the Plaintiffs. 
5. Pursuant to the January 19, 1989 Agreement, WHWC is bound 
by the statement therein that there is sufficient water to service 
Phases I and II. 
6. While WHWC may have a claim against SIDCO for additional 
water rights, the Court concludes that R.C. Tolman has no 
6 
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contractual liability to provide 25 acre feet of water to WHWC. 
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the above Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, Judgment should be entered against Defendant 
and in favor of Plaintiff as set forth above. 
SPECIAL JURY VERDICT 
On September 3, 1993, the jury returned a unanimous special 
verdict on WHWC's remaining Counterclaim issues. A copy of the 
Special Jury Verdict is attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
Wherefore, pursuant to the above Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Special Jury Verdict issued in this case 
on September 2, 1993, and for good cause appearing, the Court 
enters judgment as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. Judgment is entered pursuant to stipulation against 
Counterclaim Defendant R.C. Tolman for the $100.00 assessment and 
a $300.00 assessment in favor of WHWC. 
3. Counterclaim Defendant Lava Bluffs is to immediately turn 
over its bare legal title to one-third interest in the water system 
to Eaglebrook. 
4. The Court imposes a constructive trust upon said undivided 
one-third interest in the water system. Eaglebrook will hold said 
one-third interest in constructive trust for the sole purpose of 
turning said one-third interest over to WHWC when, and if, 
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Eaglebrook develops further property in the Winchester Hills area 
pursuant to those portions of the February 25, 1989, and January 
19, 1989 Agreements that deal with return of the one-third interest 
in the Water Company, Said constructive trust imposes no duties 
upon WHWC to pay for the use of the system while it is held by 
Eaglebrook. 
5. WHWC's claims against Counterclaim Defendant R.C. Tolman 
for 25 acre feet of water or any shortfall in water are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
6. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for the use of 
water on Mr. Tolman's pasture prior to May 1, 1989, in the amount 
of $5,500.00. 
7. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for the use of 
water on Mr. Tolman's pasture after May 1, 1989, in the amount of 
$250.00. 
8. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for use of water 
from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop before May 1, 1989, in 
the amount of $262.50. 
9. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for use of water 
from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop after May 1, 1989, in 
the amount of $55.00. 
10. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman for the use of 
water loss because of the leak at the Lava Bluff system in the 
amount of $250.00. 
11. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman to pay reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in defending claims brought by 
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Lava Bluffs Water Company because of Mr. Tolman's breach of 
fiduciary duties whereby he allowed his corporation, Eaglebrook, to 
obtain an undivided one-third interest in the water system. 
12. Judgment is entered against R.C. Tolman to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in a previous lawsuit 
against Arlene Tolman to quiet title to 125 acre feet of water 
transferred by R.C. Tolman to himself and his wife in breach of 
R.C. Tolman's fiduciary duties to WHWC. 
13. WHWC is to submit affidavits with regards to its claims 
for attorney's fees on or before October 11, 1989. 
14. All other claims pled, presented or alleged in this 
action by WHWC against R.C. Tolman are dismissed with prejudice. 
15. Interest to accrue on said judgment at the rate allowed 
by law. 
DATED this *s day of Son^gfeer, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGEMENT ENTERED 
Time: AlXZ&m 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF 
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, 
INC., and JOHN DOES I through 
V, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY 
Civil No. 900503383 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
We, the jury empaneled in the above-referenced case, find the 
issues of fact and answer the special interrogatories to us as 
follows: 
1. (a) Prior to May 1, 1989, did Winchester Hills Water 
Company authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the 
Winchester Hills Water S^scem to water Mr. Tolman's 
pasture without paying for it? 
Yes . _ _w No 
(b) 
Z? at x (If you answered Itoe- t o the q u e s t i o n immediate ly above, 
i- 9ft 
do not answer this question. «l-frb) ) 
/3b3 
2. What is the amount of damage R. C. Tolman should pay for 
the use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture prior to May 1,1989? 
5,500 
3. What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water on Mr. Tolman's pasture after May 1, 1989? 
fZ5D 
4. (a) Prior to May 1, 1989, did Winchester Hills Water Company 
authorize R. C. Tolman to use water from the unmetered 1 1/2 inch 
line to the shop without paying for it? 
v. 
Yes No 
(b)(If you answered Yes to the question immediately above,do 
not answer this question. 4 (b)). 
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop before 
May 1 , 1 9 8 9 ? ZUlM 
I3#/ 
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water from the unmetered line to Mr. Tolman's shop 
after May 1, 1989? 
' 5 5 ^ 
What is the amount of damages R. C. Tolman should pay for the 
use of water lost because of the leak at the Lava Bluff 
System? w 
Z50 OO 
Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee 
to Winchester Hills Water Company because of a Breach of 
Fiduciary^because of the 1/3 division of the water system? 
Yes A No 
r -7 ' c 
8. Is R. C. Tolman responsible to pay a reasonable Attorney Fee 
to Winchester Hills Water Company for Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty by signing the Deed for 125 acre feet of water on April 
19, 1989? 
Yes A No 
DATED this 3 ~ day of ^)ememloe.r , i9_35_. 
CONCURRING JURORS: 
QJUfon/Ht £\jdlsv{tf&r^J 
^^^L^— 
JURY FOREPERSON 
/ 1J /. 
ADDENDUM 3 
JEFFREY C. WILCOX (4441) 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
One South Main Street 
First Security Bank Building 
Post Office Box 367 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Telephone: (801) 628-1682 
Attorneys for Defendant Winchester Hills 
Water Company/ Inc. 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF 
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, 
INC., and JOHN DOES I through 
V, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 900503383 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
On October 5, 1993, this Court entered Judgment pursuant to a 
Special Verdict of the Jury dated September 3, 1993. Paragraphs 11 
and 12 of said Judgment read as follows: 
(11) Judgment is entered against R. C. Tolman to pay 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in defending 
claims brought by Lava Bluffs Water Company because of 
Mr. Tolman's breach of fiduciary duties whereby he 
allowed his corporation, Eaglebrook, to obtain an 
undivided one-third interest in the water system. 
(12) Judgment is entered against R. C. Tolman to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee incurred by WHWC in a previous 
lawsuit against Arlene Tolman to guiet title to 125 acre 
feet of water transferred to R. C. Tolman to himself and 
his wife in breach of R. C. Tolman's fiduciary duties to 
WHWC. 
Pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12 of said Judgment, this Court 
held an evidentiary hearing on February 28, 1994, and again on 
March 4, 1994, as regards to WHWC's application for reasonable 
attorney's fees. Pursuant to that hearing, WHWC presented 
testimony of David W. West, Esq., Matthew F. Hilton, Esq., and 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, Esq., the attorneys who represented WHWC during 
the pertinent times of the litigation. Each attorney presented 
billing statements or pre-billing ledgers breaking out the work 
they claimed should be appropriately billed to R. C. Tolman 
pursuant to the October 5, 1993 Judgment. Said statements and 
billing ledgers were admitted into evidence as Exhibits 1 through 
3, 
By Stipulation of the parties prior to the hearing, the hourly 
rates charged by Mr. West, Mr. Hilton and Mr. Wilcox were not an 
issue. 
At the end of the evidentiary hearing on March 4, 1994, the 
Court issued its ruling from the bench. A copy of the transcript 
containing the Court's ruling is attached as Exhibit "A" and 
incorporated by reference. Pursuant to the Court's request, said 
Exhibit "A" is in lieu of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Pursuant to the evidence presented, and the analysis of the 
Court, Judgment is hereby entered against Mr. R. C. Tolman 
personally as follows: 
1. As to the litigation between WHWC v. R.C. Tolman and 
Arlene Tolman, to quiet title to 125 acre feet of water as set 
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forth in paragraph 12 of the Judgment, the Court awards no 
attorney's fees for the reasons set forth in Exhibit "A". 
2- As to the award of attorney's fees incurred by WHWC in 
defending claims brought by Lava Bluffs Water Company, the Court 
awards none of the fees requested by Matthew F. Hilton. The 
reasons that the Court awards WHWC none of Mr. Hilton's fees is set 
forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. As to the fees claimed by 
Mr. Wilcox, the Court awards judgment in favor of WHWC and as 
against Mr. R. C. Tolman in the amount of $23,428.00 
3. The Court awards court costs to WHWC which was the 
prevailing party in the total amount of $4,232.75. Said costs are 
fully described and set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
4. Interest on the Judgment and Costs will run at the post-
judgment rate as specified by statute. 
this < j ^ — day of April, 1994. „ . ~ * . DATED 
BY THE COURT: 
*.*S2£\ 
J./Philip Eve 
District Courf JugctgQ^ --: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^ / *- , — j>* / 
Clifford/V. Dunn 
^torney for Plaintiffs 
ey C/ flllcox 
ney / t o r Defendant WHWC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
HON. J. PHILIP EVES, judge 
R.C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and LAVA BLUFF 
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER 
COMPANY, INC., and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. _______ 
Civil No. 900503383 
(Judged Ruling Only) 
* * * 
REPORTERS HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Friday, March 4, 1994 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants: 
CLIFFORD V. DUNN, ESQ. 
170 North 400 East 
Suite 9 
St. George, Utah 84770 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
BY: JEFFREY C. WILCOX, ESQ. 
One South Main Street 
St. George, Utah 84770 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
P.O. BOX 1534 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
EXHIBIT 
A 
2 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH; FRIDAY, MARCH 4, 1994 
-oOo-
THE COURT: We're back in session. It's 
one o'clock. 
Is Mr. Tolman going to join us? 
MR. DUNN: He said he would, but I haven't seen 
him. 
THE COURT: Well, we'll proceed in his absence, 
if that's all right. 
MR. DUNN: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. The parties are present 
with their counsel. Except that we'll note the absence of 
Mr. Tolman. 
The Court has spent the last two hours in — in 
considering the proof that's been presented in this case. 
And before I begin to announce my decision, I would like to 
set out the legal framework upon which the Court is going 
to hang the facts as they've been presented here to reach 
the decision. 
Let me first state that the — there is an 
American rule on attorney's fees. And generally in this 
country, when one becomes involved in a lawsuit, one is 
obligated to pay his or her own attorney's fees. There are 
exceptions to that rule. The first of those is where 
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there's an agreement that shifts the burden of attorney's 
fees to a breaching party in the agreement. The second is 
where there's a statute passed by the legislature that 
shifts that burden of attorney's fees to another party 
other than the one who incurred the fees. And by recent 
decision, there is now what is called a third-party 
attorney fee rule, which is the one that applies in this 
case, which appears to provide that in circumstances where 
there is a breach of contract or a tort which causes 
consequential damages, it is possible under that rule to 
shift the burden of attorney's fees to the person who 
breached the contract or committed the tort, so long as it 
falls within certain broad guidelines which I'm now going 
to discuss. 
The Court is well aware of the Dixie State Bank 
versus Bracken case. I've applied that in many previous 
cases. In reviewing that case, I've identified as many as 
15 or 20 factors that the Court of Appeals has suggested 
the Court consider in deciding a reasonable attorney's 
fee. I hasten to add that that case was decided not in a 
third-party tort or contract breach situation, but it was 
a — a situation where the Court was being called upon to 
determine a reasonable attorney's fee under a — a 
contract. That differs from our circumstance here. The 
Court's duty in this case is not to determine what a 
U/Ll 
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reasonable attorney's fee is. Obviously, the very concept 
of a reasonable attorney's fee vests this court with broad 
discretion in deciding whether an attorney's fee that's 
being claimed is within the bounds of reason. And the 
Court can use its own judgment, it's own knowledge of the 
case and the attorneys and so forth in deciding what's 
reasonable. This is not such a case. This is a case where 
as an item of damages, the claiming party, Winchester Hills 
Water Company, must demonstrate that they've actually 
suffered a loss. And the burden of proof is on Winchester 
Hills Water Company. They must prove their loss by a 
preponderance of the evidence. So it's a totally different 
concept than a reasonable attorney fee, to that extent. 
I have looked at the Dixie State Bank versus 
Bracken case, and I've considered the factors laid out 
there. They have some application to this case in that the 
Court still is required, I believe, to make an analysis as 
to whether the claimed attorney's fees are unreasonably 
large; whether they've been — there's been double 
billing. There's been billing in excess of the normal rate 
in this area. 
I don't find that any of those factors really 
come into play in this case. It would appear to me that 
nothing that has been claimed by Winchester Hills Water 
Company in this case would in any way violate the concepts 
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set out under Dixie State Bank versus Bracken. There isn't 
even a challenge as to the reasonableness of the fees or 
the hours actually spent which generated those fees. The 
issue in this case is to what did those fees relate. 
And that brings us, of course, to the South 
Sanpitch case and the rule of law established there. Under 
that South Sanpitch case, the only fees which the 
Winchester Hills Water Company may claim as damages are 
those fees attributable to litigation with third parties as 
a result of the actions of Mr. Tolman. The party or party 
claims — parties claiming the damages must prove the 
damages as a preponderance of the evidence, as I've said, 
and they can only be awarded where it's reasonably 
foreseeable that the tort-feasor's conduct would result in 
attorney's fees being incurred by the claimant, the water 
company, and the fees must have a causal connection to the 
act of the tort-feasor. 
Now, that rule does not contemplate that the 
claimant can recover fees that are incurred or were 
reasonably necessary as related to the tort-feasor 
himself. In other words, the Court must separate out the 
fees generated in litigation with Mr. Tolman versus fees 
generated in litigation with a third party or individual. 
In this case, at the time of trial, the jury was 
asked to find on two specific questions. The first was 
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whether or not Winchester Hills Water Company was entitled 
to recoup its attorney's fees as consequential damages 
because the jury had found that Mr. Tolman had breached his 
fiduciary duty by dividing up the water distribution system 
into thirds and then transferring one-third of that system 
to the Lava Bluff Water Company. We've been referring to 
those as the Lava Bluff claims. 
The second area was whether or not Winchester 
Hills Water Company would be entitled to recoup its 
attorney7s fees because it had found that Mr. Tolman had 
breached his fiduciary duty by deeding 125 acre feet of 
water right from the Winchester Hills Water Company to 
himself and his wife Arleen Tolman. 
In the first case, then, the claimant, 
Winchester Hills Water Company, is entitled to collect as 
consequential damages the attorney's fees incurred in 
resolving the claims of Lava Bluffs Water Company, since it 
was reasonably foreseeable that such fees would be 
necessary to recover the one-third interest in the water 
distribution system in the event that it was determined 
that that was improperly taken from Winchester Hills Water 
Company. 
In the second case, the claimant, Winchester 
Hills Water Company, is entitled to collect as 
consequential damages attorney's fees incurred in 
\CI<) 
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recovering title to the 125 acre feet of water from Arleen 
Tolman, but not fees incurred in recovering the same water 
right from R.C. Tolman. 
Let's deal with the first of the — of these 
questions. It appears to be the easier. And that's the 
question — well, let's first deal with the second 
question. That's the question of the 125 acre feet of 
water right. 
In these proceedings today, Mr. West has 
testified correctly that it was necessary to sue both 
Mr. and Mrs. Tolman to clear title to the water right. He 
has also frankly admitted that although Mrs. Tolman was a 
nominal defendant in that action, she took no active role. 
No fees were incurred in pursuing the action against her 
except those incurred in pursuing the action against 
Mr. Tolman. 
Under these circumstances, the law is clear. 
Those fees incurred in pursuing Mr. Tolman may not be 
awarded as consequential damages. The fees charged by 
Mr. West clearly were incurred in litigation with 
Mr. Tolman and not with Mrs. Tolman. Her involvement was 
incidental, at best. Therefore, under the third-party 
attorney fee rule, no fees are awardable as consequential 
damages in that action, since there's been no showing that 
Mrs. Tolman's participation or lack of participation caused 
-*' / J 
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Winchester Hills Water Company to incur any fees beyond 
those necessary to defeat Mr. Tolman's claims. 
The Court declines to award as consequential 
damages any part of the $6,324 in fees which were paid to 
Mr. West by Winchester Hills Water Company for the reason 
that they are not consequential damages assignable to 
Mrs. Tolman versus Mr. Tolman. 
Now let's turn to the more complex matter, and 
that's the question of the Lava Bluff claims. The Court 
has before it oral testimony from Mr. Wilcox and 
Mr. Hilton, as well as Exhibits 2 and 3. Those are the 
evidentiary foundation upon which the Court must determine 
the amount of attorney's fees attributable to the 
litigation over the Lava Bluff claims. 
Mr. Wilcox, in his testimony and Affidavit, has 
rendered a careful accounting of the portions of his 
billings to his clients which in his opinion are directly 
attributable to the litigation over the claims of Lava 
Bluffs. He claims that because of the complex nature of 
the suit, the novelty and originality of many of the issues 
and the number of issues, the frequency of court 
appearances and so forth, it was reasonably necessary that 
he spend the time that he did. And he has claimed the 
right to be — to have Winchester Hills Water Company 
reimbursed for 452.5 hours which he spent himself on the 
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case at $90 an hour, 19.05 hours which Mr. Jonathan Wright 
spent on the case at $90 an hour; one hour which 
Mr. Gallian — Russell Gallian spent on the case at $110 an 
hour, and one and a half hours spent by one Robin Spencer, 
who apparently is not an attorney but for which Winchester 
Hills Water Company was billed $75 an hour. The total 
claim that that firm has — has advanced is $42,662. 
Mr. Wilcox admitted, however, during his 
testimony, that his bill — billing claim should probably 
be reduced by 10 to 15 hours for the time spent on breach 
of contract claims which are unrelated to the breach of 
fiduciary duty towards — found by the jury. In addition, 
the client was not billed for eight hours of time claimed, 
and, therefore, never incurred those damages. 
So if I apply those reductions, which total 
$2,125 — that is 15 hours at $90 an hour and then eight 
hours at $90 an hour. The total reduction is 2,125 — the 
remaining claim by the Gallian, Westfall, Wilcox & Wright 
firm is $40,537. 
The Court has also reviewed its own files in 
this matter and the documents received in evidence in this 
case. The Court notes that at the time this matter went to 
trial and during the pre-trial preparation period, there 
was a counterclaim on file, filed by Winchester Hills Water 
Company. There were five claims in that counterclaim. The 
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first of those alleged breach of fiduciary duty by 
Mr. Tolman; the second alleged breach of contract by all 
three plaintiffs; the third alleged unjust enrichment 
against Mr. Tolman; the fourth sought return of the 25 acre 
feet of water from the plaintiffs — from a claimed 
mathematical miscalculation unrelated to the breaches of 
fiduciary duty found by the jury, and the fifth sought 
declaratory relief against the plaintiffs jointly, 
restraining them from various activities which would 
interfere with Winchester Hills Water — Water Company's 
operation or impair the service — their service or their 
system. 
The latter count was directed against Lava 
Bluffs. However, as the Court recalls, it was not 
litigated, and, in fact, I can't find anywhere in the 
judgment where it even was mentioned that there was to be a 
restraining order. The Court did impose a constructive 
trust on one-third of the water system held by Lava Bluff 
and ordered that — that the title to that system be 
returned to Eaglebrook to be held under the — under that 
trust pursuant to the agreements between the parties. But 
clearly, all of the counterclaim counts did not involve 
Lava Bluffs. Only those fees attributable to litigation 
with Lava Bluffs can be called consequential damages. So 
the Court has turned to Exhibit 3 in an effort to determine 
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from the documentation submitted by counsel for Winchester 
Hills Water Company exactly which of the hours set out in 
the pre-billing ledgers which Mr. Wilcox has submitted in 
support of his claim should be attributed to the litigation 
between Winchester Hills Water Company and Lava Bluffs. 
The Court has gone through those pre-billing 
ledgers and circled in red ink the hours that it thinks 
are — can be shown to be attributable — that it finds are 
attributable to that litigation. And I've done that page 
by page. Basically, what I have done is this, and the 
award I'm going to make is as follows. 
For June of 1992, I find that there were 16 
hours at $90 an hour or $1,440 attributable to that 
litigation. For the next page, which is titled June and 
part of July, 1992, I find that four hours at $90 an hour 
are attributable, $360. For August, I find no hours 
attributable. For September, 1992, I find two hours 
attributable at $90 an hour, $180. For October, 1992, I 
find no hours attributable. For November, 1992, I find 4.5 
hours at $90 an hour or $405. For December, 1992, 4.5 
hours at $90 an hour, $405. For January, 1993, I find 1.5 
hours at $90 an hour for $135. For February, 1993, I find 
16.75 hours at $90 an hour for $1,507.50. For March, 1993, 
I find 21 hours at $90 an hour for $1,890. For April, 
1993, I find 16 hours at $90 an hour for $1,440. For May 
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of 1993, I find two hours at $90 an hour for $180. For 
June of 1993, I find nine hours at $90 an hour for $810. 
For July of 1993, I find three hours at $90 an hour for 
$270. For August, 1993, I find 127.25 hours at $90 an hour 
for a total of $11,452.50. For September, 1993, I find 
32.7 hours at $90 an hour for a total of $2,943. 
So the total attorney's fees that the Court 
could determine are clearly attributable to the litigation 
with Lava Bluffs Water Company from the exhibits and 
testimony presented is $23,428. 
Now, with regard to Mr. Hilton's fees, the Court 
has followed the same process in trying to — to determine 
which of Mr. Hilton's fees are clearly attributable to the 
litigation with Lava Bluffs Water Company. Mr. Hilton's 
statements which he submitted to Winchester Hills Water 
Company and which were paid do not break out the hours that 
he thinks are attributable to the Winchester Hills Water 
Company, as do the — the statements submitted by 
Mr. Wilcox. 
Let me just pause here to point out that this is 
a relatively new rule in the law. This issue of 
attributing attorney's fees to a third-party. It's 
undoubtedly going to lead to some changes in keeping 
billing notes by the attorneys, but the Court does not lay 
any fault at Mr. Hilton's feet for not keeping more 
3£'Sl 3 
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adequate records and more complete records of what his time 
was spent on, because it's a relatively new area of law, 
and probably he was not aware that he was going to be 
called upon two or three years later to try to recount how 
he spent his time. 
But as I go through his billing statement, I 
find several things. First of all, each of those 
statements contains very brief mention — for example, 
conference with Cliff Dunn or a phone conference with Norm 
Laub — things like that, that tell me nothing about what 
the content of those conversations was or would have been. 
In addition, Mr. Hilton, when he was pressed on 
several of those notations, was unable to recreate what has 
caused that entry, because obviously it's been a long time, 
and he does not remember what he was doing on a particular 
day when he made a 15-minute phone call. It's not hard to 
understand, but it places the Court in a position of trying 
to determine whether or not it can award any of 
Mr. Hilton's fees, in view of the fact that he can't tell 
me how they were incurred. Whether they should be applied 
to the Lava Bluff litigation, or whether they should be 
applied to Mr. Tolman or Eaglebrook or some other portion 
of this lawsuit. 
Mr. Hilton, as you will recall, took a two-hour 
recess and went out and tried to recreate from his memory 
4fc?v 
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what these — these entries applied to. And he came back 
and told us that his best estimate was that about 75 
percent of these fees were applied to the Lava Bluff 
litigation, and about 25 percent were not. 
In view of Mr. Hilton's obvious lack of memory 
as to what happened on any of these given dates, the Court 
finds that estimate unconvincing. The Court finds that 
Winchester Hills Water Company has failed in its burden of 
proof regarding Mr. Hilton's fees for services rendered. 
The Court is unable to determine either from the testimony 
presented or the documentary evidence before it what amount 
of Mr. Hilton's fees should be applied to the Lava Bluffs 
litigation. And in order to do that, the Court would have 
to speculate as to what the amount of the fees would be, 
and the Court declines to do that. 
Now, this is where the difference between a 
reasonable attorney fee and damages comes in. I previously 
said that there is a difference. And this is it. If I 
were affixing a reasonable attorney fee — if there's a 
contract situation, or if it were a situation where the law 
required that the Court impose a reasonable attorney's fee, 
I would be willing, based on these statements; based on the 
complexity of the case to determine what a reasonable 
attorney's fee is. I mean I've practiced law. I've been 
in court a lot. I know what a reasonable attorney's fee 
^ L L -, -7 
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is. But I don't have that prerogative, as I view the law 
in this case. This is a matter of damage proof. And I 
find that the proof is inadequate to allow the Court to 
make any reasonable determination as to what Mr. Hilton's 
time was spent on, and therefore, the Court cannot award as 
damages any part of Mr. Hilton's fees. 
Now turning to the issue of costs. These costs 
are awarded to the prevailing party, they're not awarded 
under the South Sanpitch rationale. So the Court is going 
to award costs which are generally awarded to the 
prevailing party in a lawsuit, and that differs from 
attorney's fees. 
The Court is going to award the — the costs 
claimed by Mr. Wilcox. And those I think you ran down for 
me this morning. And all of those were reasonable and 
proper costs of the lawsuit. 
With regard to those costs which Mr. Hilton has 
identified in his statements — and he calls them 
out-of-pocket expenses — I'm going to go through those and 
state which of the costs are awardable and which are not, 
in this Court's view. 
The first statement which contains the 
out-of-pocket expenses is the statement of March 20th, 
1992. And on the last page, there are several out of 
pocket expenses listed, including fax, copies and postage. 
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None of those is a proper cost of litigation, and those 
first three items on that page are not awarded. However, 
recording fees and copies of discovery documents are 
awardable, and so I'm going to award $207 on that page as 
costs. 
The next costs list appears on the April 10th, 
1992 statement on the fifth page. Again there are several 
out-of-pocket expenses listed there, including fax costs 
and postage costs and so forth. The fax costs are not 
awardable. The postage costs are not awardable. I am 
going to award the $50 jury demand, the $227.95 for actual 
copies made, the recording fee of $7 and $200 again 
forwarded for discovery copying to Mr. Dunn. And I did not 
add that up, but whatever that adds up to. 50 plus 227.95 
plus seven plus 200. 
The next list of costs appears on the May 1st, 
1992 statement. And again, there's a lot of out-of-pocket 
expenses listed there. But the ones that are awardable are 
the $75 filing fee, the $30 service fee, the $17 witness 
fee and the $1,524.25 for deposition copies. The others 
are declined. 
The next list appears on June 10th, 1992. And 
the .out-of-pocket expenses listed there — the only one 
that's awardable is the deposition copy costs of $751.75. 
MR. DUNN: 751.75? 
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THE COURT: Correct. 
The next list appears on the June — or July 
10th, 1992 statement. And there are no out-of-pocket 
expenses awardable from that list. They're all telephone 
and fax postage type costs, which are not awardable. 
The next list appears on the December 22nd, 1992 
statement. And it consists of several items. But the one 
that is awardable is the publication of the summons in The 
Daily Spectrum, $268. The others are not awarded. 
Now, did you keep a list of those costs as I 
went through them? 
MR. WILCOX: I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. WILCOX: I didn't write down exactly which 
one it was, but — 
MR. DUNN: I'll check him. 
THE COURT: Well, I have circled each of those 
costs that I intended to award on the Exhibit No. 2. So if 
you need to refer to it, it's here. And I've tabbed each 
one of these pages I just referred to with a little yellow 
slip. 
MR. WILCOX: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Are there any questions? 
Okay. Mr. Wilcox, will you prepare the 
appropriate document for my signature? 
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MR. WILCOX: Will that be Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law? 
THE COURT: Well, I think if you'll get a copy 
of this record, that that — and attach it, that's probably 
adequate for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. I 
don't think you need to try to rehash all that. 
MR. DUNN: I think it would be preferable to 
just use the record. 
THE COURT: I would think so too. 
MR. WILCOX: So have a judgment — 
THE COURT: That sets out the award of 
attorney's fees and costs but attach as Exhibit A this — 
this record for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Is that adequate for your purposes? 
MR. WILCOX: Well, again I'm wondering do I — 
do you want me to prepare simply a judgment or Findings of 
Fact and then a judgment based on those findings? 
THE COURT: No. I want you to prepare a 
judgment but refer in the judgment to Exhibit A for 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. And Exhibit A 
will be a copy of this record that we've just made here 
this afternoon. 
MR. WILCOX: Okay. Good enough. 
THE COURT: Is that acceptable to both sides? 
MR. DUNN: That's fine with me, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you, Folks. 
We're in recess. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings in the 
above-entitled matter were concluded at 1:24 P.M.) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSRr RPR, an Official Court 
Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing matter, to wit, R.C* TOLMAN, 
et al. VS. WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, et al., CIVIL 
NO. 900503383, was taken down by me in shorthand at the 
time and place therein named and thereafter reduced to 
computerized transcription under my direction. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 30th day of March, 
1994. 
. V^Q'^TZQ^V^ 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah ! ??i^$&:. $y&nwc-SM€c((m*' 
\ $ ^ . j - '-1 NORTH 55 WEST CtRClC . 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-95 ^ j ! c S f ^ l T - S ] 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
ADDENDUM 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. C. TOLMAN, an individual, 
EAGLEBROOK CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and LAVA BLUFF 
WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, 
INC., and JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendant(s) 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Civil No. 900503383 CV 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
To assist you in performing your function in this case, the Court gives you the 
following instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. l> 
Definitions 
The following definitions are given to help you understand the 
meanings of the following terms: 
1. Fiduciary. A "fiduciary" is a person with a duty to act 
primarily for the benefit of another. 
2. Fiduciary Relationship. Generally, in a fiduciary 
relationship, the property, interest, or authority of a person or 
entity is placed in the charge of the fiduciary. 
3. Fiduciary Relationship of Corporate Officers and 
Directors. Directors and other officers of a corporation stand in 
a fiduciary relation to the corporation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. IT 
Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
their corporation and its stockholders. They are obligated to use 
their ingenuity, influence, and energy, and to employ all the 
resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the property 
and earning power of the corporation, even if the interest of the 
corporation are in conflict with their own personal interest. This 
duty of loyalty extends to all of the corporation's assets. 
The duty of the officers of a corporation is to further the 
interests in the business of the corporation and to preserve its 
property. Any action of a director looking to impair corporate 
rights or sacrifice corporate interests, the retardation of the 
objects of the corporation, should be regarded as a breach of trust 
on the part of the director engaged therein. 
A trustee, in administering the affairs of a corporation, must 
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence. Under this rule, it 
is necessary for a trustee to give the corporation such attention 
as an ordinarily discrete businessman would give to his own 
concerns under similar circumstances. 
In view of the evidence in this case, you should determine if 
Mr. Tolman's acts relating to the division of the water system into 
thirds constitutes a breach of fiduciary duties to Winchester Hills 
Water Company. 
Also, an independently, you should determine if Mr. Tolman 
breached fiduciary duties to Winchester Hills Water Company by 
signing the deed of April 19, 1989, as to the 125 acre feet of 
water. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' y 
Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
WHWC seeks damages from Mr. Tolman for breach of fiduciary 
duties. The damages sought are the reasonable attorney fees that 
it has expended in defending against Lava Bluffs' claims in this 
lawsuit. 
However, before you can find Mr. Tolman liable to pay 
Winchester Hills Water Company's reasonable attorney fees, you must 
find: 
1. That Mr. Tolman's breach of fiduciary duty resulted in 
Lava Bluffs Water Company suing Winchester Hills Water Company in 
this action. 
2. That Lava Bluffs Water Company's lawsuit against 
Winchester Hills Water Company was aA foreseeable result of Mr. 
Tolman's breach of fiduciary duty to Winchester Hills Water 
Company. 
3. That Lava Bluffs Water Company was not connected with Mr. 
Tolman's original breach of fiduciary duty. 
If you find that each of these three (3) elements exist, you 
should find that Winchester Hills Water Company is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees from Mr. Tolman. The court will determine 
the amount of attorney fees at a later date. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ip 
Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
WHWC seeks damages from Mr. Tolman for breach of fiduciary 
duties. The damages sought are the reasonable attorney .fees that 
it has expended in litigation against Mrs. Arlene Tolman regarding 
Mr. Tolman's signing the April 19, 1989 Deed regarding the 125 acre 
feet of water. 
However, before you can find Mr. Tolman liable to pay 
Winchester Hills Water Company's reasonable attorney fees, you must 
find: 
1. That Mr. Tolman's breach of fiduciary duty resulted in 
litigation with Mrs. Arlene Tolman regarding the 125 acre feet of 
water. 
2. That the litigation of the 125 acre feet of water with 
Mrs. Arlene Tolman was a naturally foreseeable result of Mr. 
Tolman's signing the April 19, 1989 Deed. 
3. That Mrs. Arlene Tolman was not connected with Mr. 
Tolman's signing the April 19, 1989 Deed. 
If you find that each of these three (3) elements exist, you 
should find that Winchester Hills Water Company is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees from Mr. Tolman. The court will determine 
the amount of attorney fees at a later date. 
